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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






IN RE:  GARY L. CODNER, 
      Petitioner  
 
 __________________________________  
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from  
the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to M.D. Pa. No. 3-14-cv-02039)  
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. Pro. 21 
February 19, 2016 
 
Before:   FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 








 Gary Leaford Codner has filed a petition for writ of mandamus.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will deny the petition. 
 Codner, who is now in federal immigration custody in the Pike County 
Correctional Facility in Pennsylvania, was convicted of possession with intent to deliver 
marijuana, in violation of 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(30), and simple 
possession, in violation of 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(16), and sentenced to a 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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term of imprisonment of 3-5 years.  Removal proceedings, which had been 
administratively closed, were reopened.  The Immigration Judge found that Codner’s 
conviction under § 780-113(a)(30) rendered him removable under 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (“Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a 
violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the 
United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in 
section 802 of Title 21), other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own 
use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.”).    
 Codner applied for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture 
(“CAT”), see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17.1  Following the agency’s first adverse decision, we 
remanded, see Codner v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 550 F. App’x 124 (3d Cir. 2014) (Codner I) 
(Board, in deciding motion for reconsideration, abused its discretion by not reconsidering 
underlying merits of petitioner’s claim, in view of its and IJ’s mistake in seemingly 
excluding significant, probative evidence).2  On remand, the IJ again denied relief and, on 
October 20, 2014, ordered Codner’s removal to Jamaica.  On January 21, 2015, the Board 
of Immigration Appeals dismissed the appeal, and Codner timely petitioned for review in 
this Court. 
                                              
1 Codner is ineligible for asylum, statutory withholding of removal, and withholding of 
removal under the CAT because his marijuana conviction constitutes a particularly 
serious crime under the Immigration & Nationality Act. 
 
2 We also held in Codner I that Codner’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies 
with respect to whether he was removable for having been convicted of a violation 
relating to a controlled substance, deprived us of jurisdiction over this issue.  550 F. 
App’x at 127 & n.1 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Alleyne v. Immigration & 




 Meanwhile, on October 23, 2014, Codner filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, see Codner v. Johnson, D.C. Civ. No. 14-cv-02039.  In this petition 
Codner argued that his § 780-113(a)(30) conviction was null and void for insufficient 
evidence in that he did not intentionally violate the state statute, and therefore his 
removal order, which was based on this conviction, was null and void.  In a supplement 
to the petition, Codner argued that he had been in immigration custody for a prolonged 
period of time, and that his pre-removal order detention was unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 
1226(c) and our decision in Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security, 656 F.3d 221, 226 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
 The United States Attorney responded to the petition, asserting that Codner was 
seeking to challenge the decision of an immigration judge who had ordered his removal 
from the United States, as well as the decision of Immigration & Customs Enforcement 
(“ICE”) officials to detain him pending his removal to Jamaica.  The U.S. Attorney 
argued that the petition should be dismissed because district courts lack jurisdiction to 
review final orders of removal, and because Codner’s current detention was lawful.  
 In an order entered on March 6, 2015, the District Court dismissed the § 2241 
petition in part and granted it in part.  The Court held that district courts lack jurisdiction 
to review final orders of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5); thus, the Court 
lacked jurisdiction to review Codner’s challenge to his removal order and underlying 
argument that his § 780-113(a)(30) conviction was null and void.  The Court was 
persuaded, however, that Codner was entitled to an individualized bond hearing, 
reasoning that he had been in ICE custody for approximately 30 months, which, in the 
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Court’s view, greatly exceeded the average detention period.  The Court reasoned that, 
after we had remanded, the Board waited approximately 6 months to remand the case to 
the IJ, and then the IJ took slightly more than 3 months to adjudicate the matter.  The 
result was a cumulative delay of more than 2 years between Codner’s initial CAT hearing 
and the IJ’s most recent adjudication of his CAT claim.  The District Court ordered the 
Government to provide Codner with an individualized bond hearing to determine if he is 
a flight risk or danger to the community by April 6, 2015, and ordered the Government to 
file a notification with the Court that Codner had received the appropriate individualized 
bond determination by April 13, 2015.  The District Court further directed the Clerk to 
close the case.  Neither party appealed this decision.  
 On April 8, 2015, Immigration Judge Walter A. Durling issued a written decision, 
concluding that the Government had met its burden of proof under Diop to show that 
Codner should not be released on bond; Codner’s detention was continued.  Judge 
Durling was not persuaded that Codner represented a danger to the community, but he 
concluded that Codner posed an unreasonable flight risk because, among other things, he 
had lived in the United States for a substantial part of his life, did not want to leave his 
family, and had fabricated his CAT claim in order to avoid removal.  Judge Durling 
observed that, although a high bond coupled with an electronic monitoring bracelet might 
suffice to reduce Codner’s risk of flight, where deportable aliens are involved, the Due 
Process Clause does not require the Government to employ the least burdensome means 
to accomplish that goal.  The Government duly reported Judge Durling’s decision to the 
District Court, and thus the Court’s order granting Codner’s § 2241 petition was fulfilled. 
5 
 
On September 11, 2015, we denied Codner’s petition for review, see Codner v. Att’y 
Gen. of U.S., 625 F. App’x 166 (3d Cir. 2015) (Codner II) (immigration judge’s implied 
finding that it was unlikely that anything would happen to alien in Jamaica on account of 
his alleged sexual orientation was not reviewable, and Board did not abuse its discretion 
in denying his motion for reconsideration).  It does not appear that Codner pursued 
review in the United States Supreme Court and he is thus now subject to removal. 
 At issue here, on January 20, 2016, Codner filed a petition for writ of mandamus 
in this Court, in which he argues that the District Court’s recent inaction in his case is a 
violation of his right to due process.  He has specifically called our attention to his post-
judgment effort to amend his § 2241 petition.  Petition, at ¶ 9.  Accordingly, we note that, 
on December 21, 2015, over 8 months after the Government had fulfilled the conditions 
of the District Court’s March 6, 2015 order granting Codner’s § 2241 petition in part, he  
submitted an item in D.C. Civ. No. 14-cv-02039, which purported to be an amended 
petition for writ of habeas corpus.  In this amendment, Codner noted our September 11, 
2015 decision denying his petition for review and sought to raise a new claim concerning 
his post-removal order detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 
U.S. 678 (2001).  Codner argued that he has been in detention for approximately 40 
months now, and still ICE has not obtained travel documents which would allow him to 
be removed to Jamaica.  Codner also argued that, because he did not intentionally violate 
§ 780-113(a)(30), the conviction is null and void, and therefore his removal order, which 
is based on this conviction, is null and void.  Codner asks that we order the District Court 
to act immediately on his post-judgment request for leave to amend his habeas corpus 
petition, and/or that we void his removal order and current detention.  Codner also has 
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filed a motion for a stay of removal.  We have been advised by ICE that Codner is 
scheduled for removal on March 10, 2016. 
 We will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.  Our jurisdiction derives from 28 
U.S.C. § 1651, which grants us the power to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in 
aid of (our) . . . jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”  A writ of 
mandamus is an extreme remedy that is used only in extraordinary situations.  See Kerr v. 
United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).  To justify the use of this 
extraordinary remedy, a petitioner must show both a clear and indisputable right to the 
writ and that he has no other adequate means to obtain the relief desired.  See Haines v. 
Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992).  Codner has no clear and indisputable 
right to have his removal order voided.  Under the Real ID Act of 2005, section 
1252(a)(5) was added to eliminate not only habeas corpus review of final orders of 
removal, but also review pursuant to the All Writs Act.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).  See 
also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9) & 1252(g).  Moreover, Codner had other adequate means to 
obtain review of his removal order and he took advantage of those other adequate means, 
including appeals to the Board of Immigration Appeals and to this Court.  Mandamus, 
with its “exceedingly narrow” scope of review, is not a substitute for an appeal.  In re: 
Chambers Development Co., Inc., 148 F.3d 214, 226 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting In re: Ford 
Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 964 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
 We also will not order the District Court to rule on Codner’s December 21, 2015 
motion for leave to amend his § 2241 petition to add a new claim challenging his post-
removal order detention under § 1231(a) and Zadvydas.  Generally, the management of 
its docket is committed to the sound discretion of the District Court, In re: Fine Paper 
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Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982).  A writ of mandamus may be 
warranted where undue delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction, Madden 
v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996).  In Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1285 
(10th Cir. 1990), for example, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district 
court’s congested docket did not justify a 14-month delay in adjudicating his habeas 
corpus petition, and in Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1978), the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court’s 14-month delay in adjudicating a 
petition following a remand denied the petitioner due process.  Codner’s motion for leave 
to amend has been pending for just over 2 months, and that amount of delay is neither 
inordinate nor tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction.  Moreover, Codner is 
scheduled for removal on March 10, 2016, which we note is within 6 months of our 
decision denying his petition for review, see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701 (construing 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) to limit post-removal order detention to period reasonably necessary 
to bring about alien’s removal, generally no more than six months). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.  The 
motion for a stay of removal is denied as moot. 
